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SYMPOSIUM
THE NEW ORIGINALISM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Editors’ Foreword
On March 1 and 2, 2013, the Fordham Law Review hosted a Symposium
entitled The New Originalism in Constitutional Law. The two-day
Symposium reflected on a host of theories that have developed since the
advent of originalism in the late 1970s and 1980s, considering if, how, and
why these theories—broadly referred to as New Originalism—should
influence constitutional interpretation. The Symposium presented five
panels that examined these questions from a variety of angles.
The first panel examined the evolution of originalism from its origins as
a theory of constitutional interpretation to the way it influences other
theories today. Professor Keith Whittington discussed the origins of
originalism as a reaction by conservative critics of the Warren Court’s
decisions, and characterized the New Originalism as a response to
criticisms of the old originalism, as well as a reconsideration of earlier
originalist assumptions and conclusions.1 Professor Whittington also
outlined points of harmony and disagreement between recent originalist
theorists and originalist critics.2 Professor Randy Barnett discussed the
gravitational force that New Originalism has on judges who accept the
relevance of original meaning, even when the original meaning of the
Constitution does not appear to be the basis of a judicial decision.3
Professor James Fleming discussed the shift from old originalism to an
inclusive New Originalism and acknowledged that reconciliation between
New Originalism and the moral reading of the Constitution may be better
than anticipated.4 Professor Fleming cautioned, however, that New
Originalism’s shift in focus from Framers’ intent to original public meaning
blunts reflection and choice in constitutional self-government.5
The second and third panels analyzed the different ways that these
theories define, identify, and use meaning in constitutional interpretation.
1. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
373 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411
(2013).
4. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
433 (2013).
5. Id.
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Professor Lawrence Solum focused his discussion on constitutional
construction, advancing two primary claims:
“First, constitutional
construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice.”6 Second, the
construction zone—where the constitutional text is underdeterminate or
irreducibly ambiguous—is ineliminable.7 Professor Larry Alexander
posited that anyone who must interpret the promulgations of legal
authorities should seek the authorially intended meaning.8 Professor
Mitchell Berman, joined in the authorship of his article by Professor Kevin
Toh, examined what they describe as the “center of gravity” of New
Originalism, identifying what judges are supposed to interpret, and what the
answer to that question implies.9 Professor Andrei Marmor discussed the
difference between originalist and nonoriginalist views between concepts
and conceptions, arguing that the debate is mostly a moral-political one
about the purpose a constitution serves and what makes it legitimate.10
Professor Scott Soames presented “Deferentialism,” a close affiliate of
originalism that first asks, “[W]hat does the law say, assert, or stipulate?”11
Once meaning is identified, “intent becomes constitutive, as opposed to
merely evidential.”12 Professor Tara Smith argued that originalism suffers
from a fatal flaw of conflating objective meaning with original meaning,
and that this flaw turns constitutional interpretation into a “he said, she
said” battle that ultimately does not provide for objective rule of law.13
The fourth panel discussed the role of history in constitutional
interpretation. Professor Jack Balkin used his own version of New
Originalism that he called “framework originalism,” developed in Living
Originalism,14 to recognize how originalists use and nonoriginalists should
use arguments from tradition and cultural memory as intellectual tools “to
understand the challenges of the present, and to argue with their fellow
citizens about the proper direction of the constitutional project in the
future.”15 Professor Saul Cornell highlighted how originalist practices are
largely antithetical to accepted historical methodology and offered an
analysis of how contemporary intellectual history provides a stronger
historical base to help facilitate a more serious debate over the proper role

6. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 453 (2013).
7. Id.
8. Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539
(2013).
9. Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from
Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545–46 (2013).
10. Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 577 (2013).
11. Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 597 (2013).
12. Id.
13. Tara Smith, Originalism, Vintage or Nouveau: “He Said, She Said” Law, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2013).
14. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2013).
15. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 718 (2013).
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of history in constitutional analysis.16 Professor Andrew Kent evaluated
how New Originalism interprets the foreign affairs provisions of the U.S.
Constitution and suggested that the exacting textualism of New Originalism
may leave a large gap between its results and the expectations and practices
of the Founders, calling New Originalism’s usefulness into question.17
The Symposium concluded with a panel discussing constitutional theory
with and without originalism. Professor Leslie Goldstein discussed the
originalist position on precedent, taking issue with the originalist argument
that U.S. Supreme Court justices should feel obliged to follow the original
understanding of the Constitution, even when it contradicts longstanding
precedent.18 In contrast to this position, Professor Goldstein argued “that
the same rule of law and popular sovereignty concerns deployed to justify
originalism are best interpreted as recommending some well-settled
precedent be upheld.”19 Professor Bernadette Meyler posited that the
constitutional construction theory that many New Originalists adopt as a
supplement to interpretation accepts that, in the absence of a majority
Founding-era view about meaning, there can be no original meaning.20
Professor Meyler argued that this position undervalues and neglects the role
of multiple meanings in constitutional analysis and in the democratic
process itself.21

16. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013).
17. Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 757 (2013).
18. Leslie F. Goldstein, Original Meaning, Precedent, and Popular Sovereignty?:
Whittington et al. v. Lincoln et al., 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 783 (2013).
19. Id. at 785.
20. Bernadette Meyler, Accepting Contested Meanings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 803
(2013).
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